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Patient Transport in the Time of COVID-19: Using Health Care 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis with Simulation to Test and 
Modify a Protocol
John Kwock, MD1 Jeffrey Holmes, MD2,3 Micheline Chipman, RN, MSN, CHSE2 Erin Siebers, MS2 Angela 
Berry, BSN, RN-BC, CN III4 Sonja Orff, MS, RN, CNL, CSCT5 Victoria Boutin,6 Leah Mallory, MD2,4,7
1Maine Medical Center, Department of Anesthesiology, Portland, ME,  2Maine Medical Center, The Hannaford Center for 
Safety, Innovation and Simulation, Portland, ME,  3Maine Medical Center, Department of Emergency Medicine, Portland, 
ME,  4Maine Medical Center, Special Infectious Disease Team, Portland, ME,  5Maine Medical Center, Operative and 
Perioperative Services, Portland, ME,  6 Maine Medical Center, Volunteer Services, Portland, ME,  7 Maine Medical Center, 
Department of Pediatrics, Division of Hospital Medicine, The Barbara Bush Children’s Hospital, Portland, ME
Introduction:  In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, an interprofessional, interdisciplinary team at 
Maine Medical Center used Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and in situ simulation 
to rapidly identify and mitigate latent safety threats (LST) in patient transport protocols.
Methods:  Following HFMEA steps, stakeholders representing a variety of disciplines assembled to address 
transport of patients with COVID-19. A process map was created to describe the process. With hazard 
analysis using table-top simulation followed by in situ simulation, we identified, categorized, and scored 
LSTs. Mitigation strategies were identified during structured debriefing.
Results:  Fourteen LSTs were identified in the categories of infection prevention (4), care coordination (2), 
equipment (2), facilities (2), teams (2), clinical skills (1), and diagnosis and treatment (1). Of these, 10 
had “critical” hazard scores. Mitigation solutions were tested with in situ simulation. Results were shared 
with leadership and led to changes in hospital-wide protocols.
Discussion:  The COVID-19 pandemic presented an urgent need to create or adapt protocols to keep patients and 
staff safe. Our team combined simulation with HFMEA methodology to improve the safety of protocols 
for transporting patients with COVID-19. Simulation enabled recreation of real-world experience that 
exposed LSTs more thoroughly than mental walkthroughs alone. Use of HFMEA methodology supported 
quantifying identified LSTs and proposing mitigation strategies, while in situ simulation facilitated testing 
many proposed strategies.
Conclusions:  HFMEA used with in situ simulation provides an effective method to efficiently and thoroughly probe a 
process for failure modes, providing practical mitigation strategies.
Keywords:  simulation, COVID-19, patient transport, latent safety threats, healthcare failure mode and effect 
analysis
Healthcare simulation increasingly plays a role in patient safety through systems integration. When used for this purpose, the objective 
is to improve processes by enhancing safety and 
efficiency. In this capacity, simulation is a highly 
effective tool for identifying “latent” safety threats 
(LST) (those that have not yet caused harm) and 
testing solutions for remediation.1
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(HFMEA) is a tool developed by the National Center 
for Patient Safety at the Department of Veterans 
Affairs that provides a proactive system to identify 
LSTs. This system counterbalances root cause 
analysis, a tool that analyzes harmful events after 
they occur.2 HFMEA helps to identify “failure modes” 
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(FMs; the ways in which a process can fail), quantify 
the severity of those FMs, prioritize resources 
to address FMs by calculating a hazard score, 
and task stakeholder-participants with identifying 
mitigation solutions. Traditionally, HFMEA is a 
theoretical exercise in which stakeholders discuss 
each step of a process and brainstorm potential 
ways the process can fail. 
Simulation enhances HFMEA by enabling realistic 
enactment of each step of a process, providing 
deeper insight than theoretical consideration 
alone.3 In situ simulation (bringing simulation to the 
clinical care environment) goes further, allowing 
stakeholders to explore and share perspectives 
that may only be apparent in the environmental 
context in which they normally provide care. LSTs 
and effective mitigation strategies are often context-
specific, and in situ simulation is ideally suited to 
reveal these context-specific LSTs and strategies.
The COVID-19 pandemic presented an urgent 
need to rapidly adapt healthcare systems with new 
processes and standards in response to novel 
stresses. The healthcare simulation community 
quickly embraced the challenge by sharing 
resources to help colleagues adapt and disseminate 
protocols for endotracheal intubation, code team 
responses, telemedicine skills, and appropriate use 
of personal protective equipment (PPE).4,5,6 Maine 
Medical Center engaged the simulation team for 
this purpose.7,8,9
In March 2020, our hospital admitted a surgical 
patient with respiratory symptoms who was later 
diagnosed with COVID-19. A team of stakeholders, 
including simulation staff, assembled the night before 
the procedure to prepare and rehearse the plan. 
The patient underwent the operation uneventfully, 
after which the team reassembled to debrief. They 
identified safety concerns related to the process 
of transporting patients with COVID-19, as this 
process could lead to widespread environmental 
and personnel contamination.
Multiple contextual factors influenced thoughts 
around best practices for transporting patients with 
COVID-19. In March 2020, information and best 
practices were rapidly evolving. Notably, ongoing 
debate about the risk of contact versus airborne 
transmission existed.10,11,12 PPE supply was 
tenuous due to a surge in worldwide demand and 
breakdown of the supply chain due to workforce 
outbreaks.13 Staff anxiety was generally high as 
reports of widespread infection of healthcare 
workers circulated.14,15
The objective of our study was to test and propose 
improvements to operating room (OR) transport 
protocols for patients with or suspected to have 
COVID-19 to minimize risks of infection.
METHODS
The team assembled for one afternoon on April 7, 
2020 to complete the bulk of an in situ simulation 
exercise guided by HFMEA. This exercise was 
co-facilitated by a physician (JK) representing 
anesthesia and a nurse lead (MC) representing 
simulation. Both facilitators are experienced 
simulation educators, and MC is also experienced in 
simulation-enhanced HFMEA processes. Planning 
and follow-up occurred in a 1- to 2-day period 
before and after the activity. Reporting to hospital 
leadership occurred the following week.
The HFMEA proceeded according to the steps 
outlined below and in Figure 1.
1. Define the topic and process
Transport of a non-intubated patient with or 
suspected to have COVID-19 to and from the OR 
was the process of focus.
2. Assemble the team
Leaders from anesthesia, simulation, and OR 
services identified additional stakeholders needed 
to fully explore the process. Table 1 summarizes 
the disciplines and departments that were invited to 
participate in the exercise.
3. Graphically describe the process
The team began by creating a process map (Figure 
2) to describe the transport process from beginning 
to end.
4. Conduct a hazard analysis
Using this process map, we began our hazard 
analysis with a table-top simulation. In this step, we 
theoretically explored each step of the process, with 
involved stakeholders sharing their perspective. 
This interprofessional team collaboratively identified 
potential FMs and, where possible, explored the 
degree of severity (potential of harm to patient or 
staff) and probability (likelihood of occurring), as 
well as mitigation strategies (Figure 3).
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Figure 1. Overview of Steps in a Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects Analysis19
*Figure adopted from Reference 19-Nielsen DS, Dieckmann P, Mohr M, Mitchell AU, Ostergaard D. 
Augmenting health care failure modes and effects analysis with simulation. Simul Healthc, 2014;9(1):48-
55
Figure 2. HFMEA Process Map for OR Transport of COVID-19 Positive Patient
The process map provided the shared mental model of patient transport the stakeholders used to guide 
their discussion and probe for failure modes. During its development, the assembled stakeholders walked 
through each step of the transport process in granular detail, with every stakeholder involved in a step 
providing their perspective of how that step works in practice.
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DEFINITIONS – PROBABILITY (P)
Frequent (4) Occasional (3) Uncommon (2) Remote (1)
Likely to occur  
 
immediately or within 
a short period 
Probably will occur 
 
may happen several 
times in 1 to 2 years
Possible to occur 
 
may happen sometime 
in 2 to 5 years
Unlikely to occur 
 
may happen sometime 
in 5 to 30 years
DEFINITIONS – SEVERITY (S)
Impact on patient Impact on clinical staff
Catastrophic (4) 
Failure would cause 
death or injury
Injury resulting in escalation in level of care, 
surgical procedure, permanent disability, or 
death
Injury resulting in permanent loss of 
function, requiring hospitalization, 
permanent or prolonged loss of ability to 
perform current duties
Major (3) 
Failure causes high 
degree of dissatisfaction
Non-life threatening delay in care or injury 
requiring medical attention without escalation 
in level of care, surgical procedure, permanent 
disability, or death
Injury requiring medical attention, 
resulting in temporary loss of function or 
missed work time
Moderate (2) 
Failure overcome with 
process improvement, 
minor performance loss 
exists
Significant negative impact on patient/family 
experience; varies from stated goals for 
patient/family experience
Reliability a source of work-related 
stress and anxiety for staff, introduces 
inefficiency that impacts frequently 
performed tasks, otherwise seen as 
negatively affecting wellness
Minor (1) 
Failure not noticeable 
to patient and would 
not affect delivery of the 
service 
No significant negative impact on patient/
family experience
Minor nuisance that is not a significant 
source of stress or anxiety for the 
majority of staff who encounter the 
problem
HAZARD SCORES (S x P)
Probability (P)
Severity (S)
Catastrophic (4) Major (3) Moderate (2) Minor (1)
Frequent (4) 16 12 8 4
Occasional (3) 12 9 6 3
Uncommon (2) 8 6 4 2
Remote (1) 4 3 2 1
Figure 3. Key for HFMEA Assignment of Severity, Probability, and Hazard Scores. HFMEA aims to identify 
failure modes and help prioritize resources to address those failure modes by calculating a hazard score. 
Hazard scores are calculated by multiplying the probability (P) of an event happening with its expected severity 
(S), both of which are scored on a 4-point scale. The criteria for assigning these scores are detailed in the 
figure. In an HFMEA, any failure mode with a hazard score greater than 8 should receive immediate attention 
and mitigation.
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The next phases of hazard analysis used simulation 
to accomplish 2 objectives, identified based on 
results from the table-top simulation. The first 
aimed to establish the optimal path of travel while 
minimizing the time spent outside of a negative-
pressure room and the potential for environmental 
or personnel contamination. The second aimed to 
test the transport protocol under stress.
Optimizing the path of travel.
Table-top simulation revealed that several possible 
routes may be used to transport patients from 
a COVID-19 unit to the OR. Route selection 
was determined based on the preferences of 
the transport team. Recognizing that each route 
presents variable risk according to hallway traffic, 
elevator size, and time spent in transit, the goal 
of this exercise was to evaluate each route and 
determine whether one presented less overall risk 
than another. Four members of the team (3 in their 
usual roles [anesthesia provider, OR transport, 
patient transport] and a simulation team member 
collecting data) pushed an empty stretcher and 
intravenous pole from the COVID-19 unit to the 
OR along each potential path of travel. During 
each run, the data collector documented possible 
bystander exposure by measuring the number of 
open doors passed (both patient rooms and offices), 
and the number of nurse’s stations and individuals 
encountered. Another team member tracked the 
transport time from the negative-pressure room to 
the threshold of the OR area.
Protocol testing with stresses.
The second phase simulated transport per 
institutional protocol to and from the OR, and 
included a mildly agitated patient (played by JK) 
to simulate a high-probability, high-severity FM 
identified during the table-top exercise.  This phase 
involved 2 scenarios.
The first scenario began in the patient room with 
a nurse educator from the COVID-19 unit who 
assumed the role of the bedside nurse in hospital-
recommended PPE (N95 respirator, face shield, 
gown, gloves, and shoe covers). The nurse 
educator prepared the patient for transport. An OR 
nurse and OR transport team member collected the 
patient using the equipment, protocols, and PPE 
recommended at the time (hospital scrubs, surgical 
mask, contact precaution gown, and gloves). 
To simulate a mildly uncooperative patient, JK 
portrayed a well-meaning person who occasionally 
removed his surgical mask while talking or coughing.
The second scenario portrayed transport back from 
the OR with the personnel who would transport 
an uncomplicated, non-intubated patient with 
COVID-19 (OR nurse, OR transport, and certified 
registered nurse anesthetist). For the return trip, 
JK simulated a state of mild agitation resulting 
from anesthesia emergence: non-adherent to 
instructions to not touch surfaces or remove their 
surgical mask and inadvertently knocked sheets/
pillows out of the stretcher while changing position. 
Stakeholders shadowed the transport team to 
observe the process from start to finish and captured 
video for subsequent review.
Following the simulations, the team debriefed to 
generate a list of FMs and mitigation strategies, 
and to consider participant perception of personal 
safety from infection transmission. The team 
then assigned severity and probability ratings to 
calculate hazard scores.
By consensus, changes to the transport protocol 
were proposed and reviewed by all team members 
and forwarded to the OR and anesthesia senior 
leadership for review and approval.
Table 1. Stakeholders Who Assembled for 
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Stakeholder
Anesthesiology (physician and CRNA*)
OR circulating RN
COVID-19 floor unit RN
Respiratory therapy
OR patient transport services
Central patient transport services
Volunteer services (oversees transport services)
Special infectious disease team
Operative and perioperative quality and safety
Simulation center leadership
Abbreviations: CRNA, certified registered nurse anesthetist; 
OR, operating room; RN, registered nurse
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RESULTS
In the HFMEA framework (Figure 1), our results 
include findings from the hazard analysis as well 
as mitigation strategies identified in the fifth step 
“Actions and Outcome Measures.” In the process 
of our hazard analysis, we identified FMs from 3 
phases of testing: (1) theoretically exploring the 
process (table-top simulation), (2) optimizing the 
path of travel, and (3) stressing the protocols in 
place to evaluate their resilience.
1. Table-top simulation
The 3 major FMs, all with critical hazard scores, 
identified from the table-top simulation included: (1) 
path of travel was at the discretion of healthcare staff 
and could result in unnecessary exposure, (2) even 
mildly agitated or uncooperative patients increase 
the risks of environmental and staff exposure to 
infection, and (3) standard recommendations for 
PPE may not be sufficient for staff while transporting 
patients.
2. Paths of travel
Table 2 displays results from path-of-travel testing. 
Several factors proved important to consider for 
safety. Path 3 offered a larger elevator space, 
which minimized close contact, but the route was 
more heavily trafficked, with 2 times the incidental 
contacts of either alternative route. The other routes 
resulted in roughly equivalent incidental exposures, 
but Path 1 had a significantly smaller elevator 
space. Considering all factors, incidental contacts, 
elevator size, and time, Path 2 was recommended 
for usual path of travel.
Table 2. Results of Path-of-Travel Testing
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
Total time in transport, min:sec 3:33 2:45 3:58
Incidental contacts during transport
  Hospital visitor 1 0 0
  Open door – patient room 0 0 5
  Staff member 6 4 8
  Open door – office or workroom 2 4 3
  Nursing station 1 0 1
Total incidental contacts 8 + desk 8 16 + desk
Notes
Smallest elevator, 
obvious path to 
radiology suites
Transport person could 
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3. Simulation-enhanced transport with mildly 
agitated patient
Table 3 shows FMs, hazard scores, and mitigation 
strategies identified with simulation-based transport 
testing.
In this exercise, 13 LSTs were noted, of which 10 
had critical hazard scores. Four of these LSTs were 
in the category of infection prevention, including the 
item with highest hazard score (12). This item noted 
that transport staff at the head of the bed could not 
maintain a 6-foot distance in an elevator or if a patient 
required assistance. To mitigate this risk, the team 
proposed a multi-faceted approach. To minimize 
close-proximity exposure, the group recommended 
a path of travel that avoided the smallest elevator. 
To better contain exposure at the source, the group 
recommended that nurses in sending units remind 
the patient of the importance of keeping their mask 
on at all times. Finally, to bolster personal protection, 
the group recommended transport staff by the head 
of the bed use a higher level of PPE.
Incidental exposure due to unexpected patient 
behavior (eg, coughing in an elevator, touching 
a rail or wall, dropping a sheet or pillow) resulted 
in at least 4 LSTs, all with critical hazard scores. 
Mitigation solutions proposed to address these 
LSTs included bringing a supply of germicidal wipes 
along on transport and adding one transport staff 
that could stay behind to ensure decontamination 
without delaying transport. They also recommended 
a higher level of PPE for transport staff by the head 
of the patient to enable them to provide safe and 
immediate assistance to the patient when needed.
4. Actions and outcome measures
After presenting results to surgical services 
leadership, recommendations were forwarded to 
hospital senior leadership, including those involved 
with infection prevention. Based on the evolving 
international understanding of best practices and 
our findings, the hospital transport policy was 
revised (Appendix 1). Notable changes based on 
the simulation-enhanced HFMEA testing included: 
(1) changing PPE for the clinician expected to 
provide direct patient care, (2) changing PPE for the 
second and/or third transport providers given the 
challenge of 6-foot distancing in some elevators, 
(3) carefully considering a need for larger transport 
teams if the patient may require direct care, and 
(4) no longer involving patient transport services 
in transporting patients with COVID-19, unless the 
staff were serving as a “runner” ahead of the team 
to clear hallways or push elevator buttons.
DISCUSSION
Used together, HFMEA and in situ simulation 
were an effective means to prospectively detect 
LSTs in our protocol for transporting patients with 
COVID-19. With support from our surgical services 
and hospital leadership, our interprofessional 
team rapidly assembled key stakeholders who 
used table-top simulation guided by HFMEA and 
in-depth hazard analysis using in situ simulation 
to discover, explore, and mitigate these LSTs. 
Because these findings involved physical paths of 
travel with concerns about time, contact, and unsafe 
patient behaviors, simulation was an ideal tool to 
explore these LSTs. Using data derived from our 
simulations, we identified the optimal path of travel 
from among 3 routes that had previously been used, 
and illustrated the risks to the patient and staff when 
using the institutional best practices in place at the 
time. Our recommendations contributed to changes 
in the number and roles of personnel involved in 
transporting patients with COVID-19, as well as the 
PPE staff use. The broad applicability of our effort 
is supported by the fact that our findings were used 
to modify not only OR transport protocols, but also 
protocols used for the entire hospital.
Simulation is well-recognized as a useful safety 
tool to recreate real-world experience to explore 
and improve complex systems in healthcare.16,17,18 
In our study, the accurate simulation of transporting 
a patient exhibiting credible behavioral variability 
was an ideal modality to evaluate safety threats in 
our process. Watching the transport nurse hesitate 
to assist the patient due to concern for exposure to 
infection, as well as the nurse’s reported sense of 
vulnerability during debriefing, highlighted the need 
for enhanced PPE for at least one member of the 
transport team. HFMEA provides a useful framework 
to approach a process; identify, categorize, and 
quantify risk in the FMs; and propose solutions 
by engaging and involving all stakeholders in the 
process.2 Together, HFMEA and simulation can 
generate a more thorough analysis than simulation 
alone.3
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Table 3. Results of HFMEA and Simulation Testing











score (SxP)   Action plan
Route determined 




Path of travel does not 




patients along path of 
travel
3 3 9
Identified optimal path 
of travel to ICU and 
patient floors
Facilities 
Transport staff unable 
to maintain a 6-foot 
distance* 
Increased risk to staff 
in elevators when 




changed to ensure 
proper PPE for 
transport staff; verbal 
engagement with 









Bystander traffic not 
prepared to institute 
safety measures 
to minimize risk of 
exposure
2 3 6
Transport staff will 
communicate that a 
patient with COVID-19 
is traveling through 
pathway; staff along 










patient about keeping 
their mask on during 
transport
Patient does not 
maintain mask over 
face and increases 
exposure to transport 
staff
3 3 9
Educate staff on 
importance of a pre-
transport brief with 
patient to discuss 
keeping mask on and 
coughing under sheet 
to decrease potential 
contamination
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Table 3 (cont). Results of HFMEA and Simulation Testing






























Guideline changed to 
increase the number 





unable to safely 
transport patient while 
maintaining a 6-foot 
distance 
Increased risk to staff 
in elevators when 
assisting patient with 
surgical mask
3 3 9
Guideline changed to 
ensure proper PPE for 
transport staff; educate 
staff about verbal 
engagement with 




equipment along path 
of travel
Transport difficulty 
increased 3 2 6
Communicate with staff 













Transport patient with 
portable pulse oximeter 
at a minimum due to 







increased 3 2 6
Minimize necessary 
equipment (eg, remove 
maintenance IV); place 




Transport staff at 
head of bed not able 
to maintain 6-foot 
distance due to small 
elevators*
Increased risk to staff 
at head of bed 3 4 12
Educate staff at head of 
bed to wear N95 mask, 
eye protection, and 
gown
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Table 3 (cont). Results of HFMEA and Simulation Testing























surfaces that may be 
touched by transport 
or bystander staff 
Increased risk 




staff to monitor 
and immediately 
decontaminate surfaces 




Patient coughs in 
elevator
Dwell time of virus 
increases risk to 

















transport staff; bring 
portable germicidal 
wipes and assign 














team on sufficient 
dry time after surface 
decontamination
Abbreviations: CRNA, certified registered nurse anesthetist; HFMEA, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis; ICU, intensive care unit; IV, intravenous; PPE, 
personal protective equipment; RN, registered nurse.
*Failure modes identified only during in situ simulations.
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In the year after SARS-CoV-2 arrived, multiple 
reports have described how simulation can help 
to rapidly evolve healthcare processes driven by a 
novel threat to society.20,21,22 OR protocols are just 
one high-stakes area in which COVID-19 markedly 
changed usual practices. Lie et al described a 
similar but larger-scale endeavor to use in situ 
simulation to improve OR preparedness in their 
Singapore hospital. Their study, though broader 
in scope, identified the transport process as the 
first major LST detected.23 Patient transport is a 
high-risk event, as it often results from a change in 
patient condition and invariably involves a hand-off 
between teams of providers. Just before COVID-19 
was officially labeled a pandemic, a group from 
Singapore identified patient transport as a high-risk 
event for nosocomial spread. They wrote a letter 
to the journal Critical Care that proposed 5 areas 
of safety concern to help guide other hospital’s 
policies for transporting patients with COVID-19.24 
They identified patient safety, safety of healthcare 
workers and transport staff, bystander safety, 
rescue and contingency plans during transport, and 
post-transport decontamination as areas of risk. 
Each of these areas was reflected in FMs identified 
in our study (Table 3). These recommendations 
were based on their own early experience, and 
they hoped that by sharing their retrospective 
experience, other hospitals could learn and avoid 
harm to patients or staff. Our approach, using 
HFMEA and in situ simulation, enabled prospective 
experience that enhanced safety at our institution.
Eight months into the COVID-19 pandemic, Van 
Zundert and colleagues called for the review of 
airway and patient management workflows using 
proven patient safety tools, such as HFMEA 
and simulation.25 They cited the incomplete 
understanding of the risks of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission  and uncertainty around PPE and 
best clinical practices to reduce infection risk, as 
ongoing threats to the physical and emotional 
safety of healthcare workers. Levy and colleagues 
combined HFMEA with in situ simulation in an 
iterative fashion to safety test a field hospital 
before caring for patients.26 A group in Latvia 
used simulation and HFMEA to decrease risk of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in their emergency 
department. In their study, 2 major areas of LSTs 
included PPE and the need to establish or revise 
protocols.27 In our testing, our team found that 
PPE recommended for personnel transporting 
the patient was likely insufficient to protect staff in 
the event of even minimal changes in a patient’s 
condition. By revising policies to include equipment 
that protects individuals at the head of the bed from 
airborne infection, at minimum, staff could respond 
to the patient’s needs and still maintain personal 
protection. This change has become even more 
relevant with our evolving understanding of the 
predominantly airborne risk of infection.10,11,12
Our table-top exercise revealed that patient 
transport personnel were likely inadvertently put in 
positions of previously unanticipated risk of infection. 
In theory, patient transport personnel do not have 
direct patient care responsibility or patient contact, 
and thus they use standard precautions to prevent 
infection. By including transport personnel as 
stakeholders in our hazard analysis, we discovered 
that, in practice, personnel may not be able to 
avoid direct patient contact if the patient requires 
basic assistance. Also, personnel might be near a 
patient for previously unanticipated lengths of time 
(eg, waiting for a ride to arrive when discharged). 
Following our exercise, hospital leadership revised 
policies to ensure transport personnel were not 
involved in transporting patients with COVID-19, 
unless they were used as a front runner without 
being near the patient.
Limitations
This project was time-sensitive in addressing an 
immediate need to prevent infection during a global 
pandemic. As such, we could not conduct iterative 
rounds of simulation to test all identified mitigation 
strategies. Re-testing with relevant stakeholders 
ensures that the proposed mitigation strategies 
are practical and achievable. Although we found 
that post-transport decontamination or emergent 
decontamination after inadvertent exposure 
during transport was an important LST, we omitted 
an important stakeholder from our exercise: 
environmental services.This omission resulted in an 
incomplete analysis of the threats of infection and 
lingering action items, highlighting the importance of 
involving all stakeholders to completely understand, 
analyze, and diminish safety concerns.
This work was rooted in a local context, probing our 
center’s protocol and using available resources. 
In situ simulation is resource intensive. To plan 
and execute this exercise required support from 
leadership at the highest levels, the time of multiple 
stakeholders across several disciplines, and a 
simulation center capable of in situ simulation with 
expertise in HFMEA. These resources may not 
always be readily available.
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CONCLUSIONS
The COVID-19 pandemic required rapid changes to 
multiple healthcare protocols to minimize infectious 
risk to patients and staff. This need presented a 
unique opportunity to demonstrate the power of 
HFMEA combined with simulation to rapidly provide 
actionable, practical solutions to problems, both 
anticipated and unforeseen. Using these methods, 
we prospectively identified multiple FMs in existing 
OR transport protocols, quickly proposed solutions, 
and partnered with hospital leaders to optimize 
safety.
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